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TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL 
BANKRUPTCY POLICY IN 
EUROPE: FOUR DECADES IN 
SEARCH OF A TREATY 
LESLIE A. BURTON" 
As multinational trade has increased, so has the need for cross-
border insolvency agreements. For forty years, the European 
Community and European Union have attempted to agree on 
cross-border insolvency procedures. The author explores the 
history of these efforts, the policy issues which have made 
agreement difficult, and the demise of the EUs best hope for a 
cross-border insolvency agreement: the failed 1995 Convention. 
Finally, she compares past and current proposals, and explains 
why they are inferior solutions to the failed Convention. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of bankruptcy or insolvencf proceedings is for one 
forum to take control of all of a debtor's assets, and to 
distribute them under a consistent set of rules which will 
ensure that the debtor and all of the creditors are treated fairly 
and equally.2 Cross-border insolvencies are becoming more 
* Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California. 
BA, magna cum laude, University of Portland (1976); JD, cum laude, Santa Clara Law 
School (1979). 
1. "Insolvency," rather than "bankruptcy," is the term used in most English-
speaking countries. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 563 n.3 (1996). 
2. Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to 
Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 533 n.2 
205 
1
Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
206 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
common in these modern times of multinational corporations 
and increasing cross-border business transactions. As a result, 
a single insolvency filing can involve creditors and property 
located in many countries, each of which has different 
insolvency laws, affecting who is eligible to file, where the case 
should be filed, which creditors will have priority, and whether 
a liquidation or a reorganization is appropriate. These 
differences can thwart the purpose of insolvency. Further, 
countries seeking to favor their own citizens or property may 
refuse to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings, thus causing 
inconsistent results for similar creditors who reside in different 
countries. 
Private international law has been unable to ensure equal 
treatment of creditors across nationallines.3 As a result many 
countries, particularly in Europe, have looked to the concept of 
a treaty or convention to resolve these issues. In fact, various 
European countries have been struggling for more than 40 
years to establish an insolvency convention. So far their efforts 
have been unsuccessful. The reasons for the failure to reach an 
insolvency convention are procedural as well as substantive. 
Jurisdiction is one such problem. A multinational corporation 
that has assets in one country, debts in another, and assets in 
yet another, could choose to file insolvency proceeding in one of 
a number of potential forums. The debtor could, for example, 
file where it is incorporated; where it owns the most valuable 
assets; where it owns any assets; where it owes the largest 
debts; or where it owes any debts. 
Another perennial problem arises from the conflict of laws. 
Choosing a particular forum does not. necessarily determine 
(1996), quoting Michael Bogdan, International Bankruptcy Law in Scandinavia, 43 
INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 49,50 (1985). "[I]t would be better in nine cases out often that all 
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in a single 
proceeding, and generally at a single place . . ." Douglas Boshkoff, Some Gloomy 
Thoughts Concerning Cross·Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 939 (1994), 
quoting John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARv. 
L. REV. 259, 264 (1888). 
3. Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 
INT'L LAw. 429, 433 (1993). 
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which substantive law will apply to the insolvency proceedings. 
If an insolvent corporation owing debts in several countries 
were formed in one country, maintained offices in other 
countries, and owned assets in other countries, which country's 
laws would apply to the insolvency proceeding? If a security 
interest were valid in the home country but not in the country 
where the assets are located, which country's laws would 
govern? If a debtor is "eligible" to file in one country but not 
another, which country's laws would control? 
Differences in national insolvency laws often reflect differing 
political goals and cultural expectations.4 In France, for 
instance, one of the main goals of an insolvency proceeding is to 
preserve jobs,5 even to the detriment of creditors' rights. This 
is far different from the German system, which gives the 
balance of power to the creditors so they can maximize their 
recovery.s The United Kingdom provides liberal exemptions, 
especially regarding the "matrimonial home,'>7 while many 
nations allow few if any exemptions. These differences are 
compounded by each country's reluctance to turn over assets 
located in its own territory to an insolvency proceeding in a 
foreign jurisdiction. Which country's laws should govern the 
resolution of these issues? 
A European insolvency convention would establish policies and 
procedures to resolve these problems. Yet no policy or treaty 
exists among European nations.s This failure is not, however, 
due to lack of effort. 
4. Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 936. 
5. Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 491 (1996). 
6. Id. 
7. Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 937 n.28. 
8. One exception exists: The Convention Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden Regarding Bankruptcy, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 133 (1933) 
(Nordic Convention). The Nordic countries historically have had similar traditions and 
laws, making it somewhat simpler for them to enter into a treaty. Fletcher, supra note 
3, at 437; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534; Balz, supra note 5, at 491 n.2l. Like any 
treaty, the Nordic Convention established rights and obligations only between those 
countries that have ratified it, and does not apply elsewhere in Europe. 
3
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This article begins with an exploration of the history of 
European attempts (particularly by the Member States of the 
European Union9) to reach an insolvency convention. Next, it 
analyzes the problems that have prevented ratification of an 
insolvency convention, and considers why such attempts have 
continually failed. Finally, this article regrets the failure of the 
European Union Convention 'on Insolvency Proceedings, which 
offers the most realistic and viable solution to the European 
insolvency dilemma, and urges the resurrection and· 
ratification of the EU Convention. The EU Convention, agreed 
to in theory by the fifteen EU countries, was signed by fourteen 
of them before May 1996. The EU Convention was derailed by 
the United Kingdom's eleventh hour refusal to sign it, as a 
reprisal for the EU's ban on beef products in the wake of the 
U.K.'s epidemic of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or 
"Mad Cow") disease. Finally, this article discusses potential 
alternatives to the EU Convention, particularly with a view to 
their advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis the EU 
Convention. 
II. THE EARLY ATTEMPTS 
A. THE EEC BANKRUPI'CY CONVENTION 
Historically, each European nation had its own insolvency law, 
which generally allowed liquidation (but not reorganization) 
insolvency proceedings.10 Each country's insolvency law 
differed, from the definition of "insolvent"U to such issues as 
9. The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, 31I.L.M. 247, by the Member States of the European 
Communities (European Community for Coal and Steel, European Economic 
Community, European Atomic Community), in order to create a closer union among 
them. The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957,298 
U.N.T.S. 11. The EEC has been renamed the European Community (EC). The 
current EU Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
10. Balz, supra note 5, at 491. 
11. Germany uses a balance sheet insolvency test (which is based on a 
determination of whether the debtor's debts exceed its assets). Balz, supra note 5, at 
485. France uses an equity insolvency test (which is based on a determination of 
whether the debtor is unable to pay its debts as they mature). [d. Some nations use a 
4
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eligibility to file, the extent of "estate property" (Le., property 
subject to administration in the insolvency proceeding), validity 
of security interests, avoid ability of certain pre-insolvency 
transfers, and the applicability of real estate, tax, and labor 
laws. These differing laws created problems for cross-border or 
multinational insolvencies. The problems worsened as 
increasing travel and trade between the European nations 
resulted in increasing transnational debts and movement of 
assets from one place to another. 
In 1960, the European Economic Community (EEC) began to 
make a concerted effort to address the problem of cross-border 
insolvency proceedings. 12 Starting in 1963, a committee 
working under the auspices of the Commission began drafting 
a Bankruptcy ConventionP The committee's challenge was to 
establish a procedure that would harmonize the Member 
States' different laws and resolve the issues that arose. 
The drafting committee considered two competing approaches 
to dealing with international insolvency issues: the 
territorialist approach and the universalist approach. 
Under the territorialist approach, the courts of each country 
would be limited to adjudicating the debtor's assets and claims 
located within that country,t4 and would refuse to recognize 
foreign orders from outside national borders.15 A country 
might wish to use a territorialist approach to guarantee that 
the rights of its own creditors are adequately protected. 
Carried to the extreme, however, this position would not allow 
for any cross-border agreement recognizing a foreign insolvency 
proceeding. 
test of whether a debtor has committed an "act of bankruptcy," which does not 
necessarily have to include any insolvency finding. Id. The United Kingdom and 
France do not require that a company meet any insolvency test as a precondition of 
filing an insolvency proceeding. Id. at 499. 
12. Balz, supra note 5, at 489; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" 
Convention, supra note 12. EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE NO. 55, Oct. 19, 
1995, available in LEXIS, International Law Library, ECNEWS File. 
13. Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12. 
14. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 533-34. 
15. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 432. 
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The universalist approach, in contrast, requires that each 
country automatically recognize the authority of other 
countries' bankruptcy proceedings.l6 Insolvency proceedings in 
one country would have full effect over all of a debtor's assets 
and creditors, wherever 10catedY An even more extreme 
variant of the universalist approach is the so-called unitarian 
approach, under which all countries would cede their authority 
to one forum that would be responsible for overseeing the 
entire insolvency proceeding, to the exclusion of any other 
forum. IS Thus, rather than each country recognizing the other 
countries' insolvency proceedings, one insolvency proceeding 
would be established to handle all of a debtor's European 
insolvency proceedings. The one forum would be given powers 
which would supersede locallawsl9 such as those regarding the 
priority or allowability of claims, ownership of real and 
personal property, and avoidability of preferential transfers. 
However, agreeing on which forum should govern has been 
problematic. 
In the 1960s the majority of European states already accorded 
some degree of recognition to foreign proceedings, but differed 
as to the amount and type of recognition they would give.20 
None went so far as to embrace a true universalist, let alone a 
unitarian, approach. A universalist approach, however, is 
truer to the purpose of insolvency proceedings because it seeks 
to bring all issues together in one forum that would treat all 
creditors equally. 
After examining the territorialist and universalist approaches, 
the EEC committee on international insolvency adopted a 
Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention21 in 1970. The 1970 EEC 
16. Balz, supra note 5, at 492. The Nordic Convention, supra note 8, is based on a 
universalist theory. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534. 
17. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 433. 
lB. Balz, supra note 5, at 492. 
19. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534. 
20. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 433. 
21. EC Doc. IIII721BO (1990). This convention was drafted under the authority of 
article 220 of the Treaty of Rome: «Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter 
into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their 
nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments .... " Conventions under article 220, like conventions under 
6
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Draft utilized a radical full universality / unitarian approach. 
It proposed a system under which a single international 
insolvency law would govern all European liquidation 
insolvency proceedings,22 and used uniform laws to determine 
the rights of the debtor and its creditors, wherever in Europe 
they might be. One liquidator would be responsible for 
administering the insolvency both in his own country and 
outside of it.23 No ancillary or secondary proceedings were 
allowed,24 meaning that once one country had jurisdiction over 
the insolvency, no other country could conduct any separate 
insolvency proceedings on its own.25 Of course, like any treaty, 
the 1970 EEC Draft would apply only to signatory nations. 
After the committee adopted the 1970 EEC Draft, several new 
countries joined the EEC.26 Due partly to the new Member 
States' adverse comments, the committee made changes to the 
EEC Draft that significantly diluted its uniform law provisions. 
The new version was called the 1980 EEC Draft Bankruptcy 
Convention.27 Under the 1980 EEC Draft, one liquidator would 
have direct responsibility for administering insolvency 
proceedings inside and outside the country that appointed him. 
Outside the country that appointed him, however, the 
liquidator would have to resolve matters under applicable rules 
of private internationallaw.28 The 1980 EEC Draft also called 
for the creation of "sub-estates" in those countries that 
traditional international law, must be signed and ratified by all of the contacting 
states. 
22. EC Doc. III172!80 (1990). 
23. Carl '!Jur, An Analysis of the 1980 Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention, 109 
INT'L Bus. LAw. 22, 22 (1982). 
24. Explanatory Report to the EU Convention, supra note 65 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996); Nielsen, supra note 2, at 539. 
25. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, European Information 
Service European Report, June 20, 1995, available in LEfUS, INTLAW Library, 
ECNEWS File. 
26. Between 1970 and 1980, three nations joined: the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
and Denmark. 
27. '!Jur, supra note 23, at 24. 
28. Id. 
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contained the 9.ebtor's assets, and allowed local creditors to be 
reimbursed first from the local sub-estate.29 
Even after having been weakened considerably, the 1980 EEC 
Draft Bankruptcy Convention remained unpopular. Although 
it was revised again in 1982, and yet again in 1984, the 
Convention never gained enough support to be opened for 
signature.3o Criticism revolved largely around concerns that it 
would be unworkable for one forum to administer one 
centralized insolvency estate, given the enormous range of 
differences in countries' insolvency laws.3l Some called the 
Convention an "overambitious model'132 requiring an "overly 
rigid centralization . . . unacceptable for most" European 
countries.33 
The committee finally abandoned the EEC Draft in 1985.34 
Negotiations were resumed in 1989 in a different form, known 
as the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 
discussed in Part III below. 
B. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL 
AsPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY (ISTANBUL CONVENTION)35 
In 1989 in Strasbourg the Council of Europe36 convened and 
began to draft the European Convention on Certain 
29. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 11; 
'IJur, supra note 23, at 24. 
30. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 6; 
Balz, supra note 5, at 492. 
31. Balz, supra note 5, at 492. 
32. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 437. 
33. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 13; 
Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12. 
34. Other complaints about the EC Draft included a fear that it discriminated 
against those outside the community. One commentator referred to its "crudely 
aggressive attitude toward non-member States." Fletcher, supra note 3, at 441. 
35. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy 
(Istanbul Convention), opened for signature, June 5, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 165 (1991). Some 
sources refer to this as the Strasbourg Convention. See, e.g., Balz, supra note 5, at 485; 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of 
Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 487 (1991). 
36. The Council of Europe, founded on May 5, 1949, is an organization formed to 
promote cooperation between the European countries. Most European countries, 
including those who are not members of the European Union, are members. In 1990 
the twenty members were: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
8
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International Aspects of Bankruptcy.37 It ultimately proposed 
a multilateral treaty that was known as the European 
Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, or 
the Istanbul Convention. 
The Council of Europe commenced its work on the Istanbul 
Convention during a period of great change in the law of 
insolvency. In the 1980s, many nations amended their 
insolvency laws, expanded the use of reorganization 
proceedings in addition to liquidation proceedings, and in some 
cases allowed reorganization proceedings for the first time.3s 
Ironically, at the same time the Council of Europe was working 
towards harmonization, the individual countries were enacting 
national law reforms that resulted in even less harmonization 
among their insolvency laws.39 
The Istanbul Convention rejected the maligned unitarian (one 
forum) approach that had been so heavily criticized in the 
earlier 1970 EEC Draft. Instead, it adopted a flexible approach 
to the universalist theory.40 The central tenet of the Istanbul 
Convention was that one main insolvency proceeding would be 
opened in a centralized administrative forum in the country 
that was the "center of ... [the insolvent debtor's] main 
interests."41 Like the EEC Draft Conventions, the Istanbul 
Convention addressed only liquidating bankruptcies, and 
provided that a liquidator appointed in the main forum could 
move to protect assets located in another country.42 Unlike the 
EEC Draft, the Istanbul Convention provided that to 
administer the assets in the second country, the liquidator 
must seek authority from that country, advertise his 
Greece, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Switzerland. The Council of 
Europe should not be confused with the Council of Ministers or the European Council, 
which are organs ofthe European Union. 
37. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art 4(1). 
38. Balz, supra note 5, at 499. 
39. [d. at 498. 
40. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 540.n. 57. 
41. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art 4(1). The Convention provides a 
rebuttable presumption that this is the country of incorporation. [d. 
42. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 10; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 438. 
9
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appointment, and wait for two months.43 Also unlike the EEC 
Draft, the Istanbul Convention provided that the main 
proceeding need not be the only authorized forum; it could be 
supplemented by secondary proceedings in any other country in 
which the debtor had an "establishment.'!44 The Istanbul 
Convention provided that secondary proceedings would be 
administered under local law, thus resolving problems arising 
from issues such as the validity of security interests.45 
Under the Istanbul Convention, certain creditors (generally 
those holding priority and secured claims) would be allowed to 
file their claims in a secondary proceeding in their own 
country, instead of in the main proceeding.46 Claims filed in 
the secondary proceeding would be paid first from the assets 
subject to the secondary proceedings. The balance of the assets 
remaining would then be forwarded to the main proceeding, 
where the other creditors could file their claims and be paid.47 
Objections to this procedure focused on national laws of some 
countries (e.g. France), which accord "priority status" to a large 
number of claims in an insolvency proceeding, and thus allow 
these creditors to be paid in full before any money is paid to 
any other creditors.48 Consequently, in a proceeding involving 
assets in France and assets in other countries, the French 
creditors would be unfairly favored. Although the Istanbul 
Convention did not resolve this problem, it did provide that the 
ordinary, unsecured creditor who obtains partial payment of a 
claim in one insolvency proceeding, may not participate in any 
distribution from any other insolvency proceeding, until such 
time as the other creditors have received an equal pro rata 
portion of their claims.49 
Despite its perceived improvements vis-a.-vis the earlier EEC 
Draft, the Istanbul Convention was nonetheless criticized. One 
43. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 9-11. 
44. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 17. 
45. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 19-22. 
46. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 11, 21. 
47. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 22, 31; Balz, supra note 5, at 521. 
48. Balz, supra note 5, at 521. 
49. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 5. 
10
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weakness of the Istanbul Convention was the ambiguity of 
some of its central concepts, such as the terms "center of main 
interests" and "establishment." These terms were not clearly 
defined in the Convention, and thus were likely to lead to 
forum shopping and disputes over jurisdiction. Further, the 
Istanbul Convention relied on "indirect" jurisdiction, meaning 
that although it contained rules for recognizing and enforcing 
judgments, it did not impose any mandatory jurisdictional 
rules,50 thus creating a further potential for disagreements. 
Worse, the Istanbul Convention did not contain any 
mechanism to resolve interpretation difficulties. The Council 
of Europe - unlike the European Union - has no European 
Court of Justice with jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the 
Istanbul Convention.51 AB a result, any ambiguities in the 
Istanbul Convention would be subject to differing national 
interpretations, with no mechanism for uniformity. 
Paradoxically, the Istanbul Convention, which was meant to 
lead to more harmony, would in fact lead to more diversity. 
The Istanbul Convention's attempt to give countries some 
autonomy to apply their own national insolvency law in the 
secondary proceedings was thought to be unfair and to defeat 
the purpose of insolvency proceedings, viz. administration of 
the debtor's assets in one forum, and distribution to all 
creditors equally under a uniform set of laws. The greatest 
objections were to the Istanbul Convention's granting of an "opt 
out" provision, under which nations would have the ability to 
choose not to be bound by some of the Convention's 
provisions,52 including the chapters most important to 
universality. The opt-out provisions apply to chapter II,53 
which establishes the circumstances under which a liquidator's 
cross-border powers can be recognized, and chapter III,54 which 
authorizes member states to maintain secondary proceedings. 
50. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 4; Ian F. Fletcher, The European 
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment with U.S. 
Interest in Mind, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25, 29 (1997). 
51. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439. 
52. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 40. 
53. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 6-15. 
54. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 16-28. 
11
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By opting out of Chapter II, a country would be free to refuse to 
recognize an out-of-state liquidator's cross-border powers. By 
opting out of Chapter III, a country could refuse to relegate its 
country's insolvency proceedings to "secondary" status. 
By allowing countries to opt-out of the universality provisions 
of the Istanbul Convention, its drafters enervated the 
Convention. The Istanbul Convention's potential for achieving 
diverse national rules was high,55 which defeated its 
universalist purpose. Because the "opt out" provisions 
undermined the universalist provisions of the Convention, 
some called it a "convention a la carte.'){;6 Others commented 
that unlike the earlier "overambitious" EEC Draft, the Istanbul 
Convention was not ambitious enough.57 In contrast to the 
EEC Draft, which was too strong, the Istanbul Convention was 
too weak. 
The Istanbul Convention was opened for signature in Istanbul 
in June 1990.58 In the end only six nations signed the Istanbul 
Convention: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, 
and Turkey.59 None went so far as to ratify or otherwise adopt 
it.60 
Some nations did not sign because they were awaiting a new 
European Union Insolvency Convention, which was expected to 
be produced by a committee of the Council of Ministers that 
had been convened the year before.61 Although it never became 
law, the Istanbul Convention exerted a significant influence on 
the EU committee and its Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings, discussed in Part III below. 
55. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439. 
56. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 20; 
Balz, supra note 5, at 494. 
57. Id. at 490. 
58. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35. 
59. Id. 
60. Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12. 
61. Balz, supra note 5, at 492 n.30. 
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III. EUROPEAN UNION CONVENTION ON INSOLVENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 
The European Union Council of Ministers62 viewed the absence 
of a European insolvency treaty as a "shortcoming in the 
completion of the internal market.'>63 Therefore in 1989 it 
formed a working group to propose a Convention.64 In 1995 
this working group produced the European Union Convention 
on Insolvency Proceedings (EU Convention),65 which came the 
closest to becoming a ratified multilateral treaty. It ultimately 
failed as well, albeit for different reasons than those that 
toppled the EEC Draft and the Istanbul Convention. 
Like the Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention was 
intended to utilize the principle of universality to create a 
single, main insolvency proceedingB6 and to harmonize rules for 
the administration of insolvency proceedings.67 Unlike the 
Istanbul Convention, however, the EU Convention aimed to 
allocate direct jurisdiction, and to encompass reorganization as 
well as liquidation proceedings. The EU Convention's attempts 
to cure problems raised in previous conventions had mixed 
success. 
A. NEW SOLUTIONS TO PERENNIAL PROBLEMS 
Like each of its predecessors, the EU Convention attempted to 
resolve the uncertainty regarding which law would apply in 
international insolvency proceedings. The conflict of laws 
problem arose from the existence of different national 
62. The EU Council of Ministers is the principal law-making body of the EU. It is 
distinct from, and should not be confused with the Council of Europe, supra note 36, or 
the European Council. 
63. Explanatory Report to the European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings, supra note 24. 
64. Balz, supra note 5, at 494. The working group operated in secret. The first 
reports of its existence did not emerge until late 1991. EC: Talks Begin Over European 
Insolvency Harrrwny, REUTERS TEXTLINE, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Oct. 24, 1991 
available on LEXIS, INTLA W Library, ECNEWS File. 
65. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (EU Convention), 
opened for signature, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996). Many consider this 
convention as a continuation or revitalization of the earlier EEC Draft Convention. 
See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 540. 
66. Explanatory Report, supra note 24; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 544. 
67. Balz, supra note 5, at 495. 
13
Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
218 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
insolvency laws reflecting different social and economic goals. 
In France, for example, one of the main goals of a 
reorganization proceeding is to preserve French jobs; in 
Germany, the main goal is to allow the creditors to be made 
whole. In France, whether the insolvency trustee can avoid a 
pre-insolvency transfer is a question of insolvency law; in 
Germany, it is an issue of civil procedure law. In some 
countries, including the part of Germany which formerly was 
East Germany (the so-called Neue Bundesliinder), the debtor is 
entitled to a "fresh start" at the end of an insolvency proceeding 
in the form of a discharge of the remaining balance of all 
unpaid debts. But in most European countries, including the 
part of Germany that was formerly West Germany, no 
discharge is available.68 
An example will illustrate this concept: A French company 
employing many French citizens may owe money to creditors 
who reside in Germany. In a reorganization proceeding, the 
French would argue that the company should remain in 
business because many French jobs are at stake, while the 
Germans would argue that the company should be liquidated 
so that creditors can be paid immediately. The East German 
creditors would not be able to continue to pursue the debtor for. 
payments after the bankruptcy was over; the West Germans 
would. The EU Convention seeks to harmonize these laws by 
adopting a modified universality theory, blending a "framework 
of member state cooperation" with a recognition of the "unique 
aspects of member state's laws.'>69 
68. Bernard Schollmeyer, The New European Convention on International 
Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 437 (1997); Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 936. Under 
reforms to the German bankruptcy law that will take effect in 1999, discharges will be 
available to all German debtors. Schollmeyer, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. at 437. 
69. EU Moves Toward the Creation of a European Convention, EUROWATCH, 
April 15, 1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. The modified 
universality theory was not the preferred approach of the Commission, which would 
have liked to have seen a convention based on the idea of one single insolvency 
proceeding (i.e., the unity principle). Bankruptcy Convention, COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RAPID PRESS RELEASE, Sept. 26, 1995, available on 
LEXIS, INTLA W Library, ECNEWS File. 
14
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/8
1999] EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY POLICY 219 
The EU Convention's solution was to establish one set of 
insolvency procedures with community-wide effect.70 Like the 
Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention would allow an 
insolvent debtor to file insolvency proceedings at its "main 
center of interests.'171 For individuals, that is presumed to be 
the domicile; for a corporation, it is presumed to be its place of 
incorporation. These presumptions, however, are rebuttable.72 
Unfortunately the EU Convention - like the Istanbul 
Convention - does not provide a comprehensive definition for 
the term "main center of interests.'1'13 The EU convention also 
defines the term "establishment" in a way that commentators 
believe is likely to give rise to arguments over interpretation?4 
Thus, the same danger that existed under the Istanbul 
Convention persists under the EU Convention: disputes and 
litigation over the location of a debtor's center of main 
interests.75 It does seem, however, that tests applied to resolve 
other conflict of laws situations or to interpret jurisdiction 
under other conYentions, should provide some guidance. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that there is no dispute 
over the location of the debtor's main center of interests, the 
EU Convention provides that an insolvency proceeding filed 
there would be the "main" proceeding and must be recognized 
in the other countries.76 The law of the main forum provides 
the source of law governing the insolvency proceedings77 (with 
minor exceptions explained below). Under the EU Convention, 
the law of the main insolvency forum will determine who is 
70. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 4(1); Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422. 
71. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(1). 
72. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(1); Explanatory Report, supra note 24; 
Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 426. 
73. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 36. 
74. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 38. Establishment is defmed as "any place of 
operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human 
means and goods." ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 2(h). 
75. Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, EUROPE 
INFORMATION SERVICE NO. 2201, Feb. 22, 1997; available on LEXIS, INTLAW 
Library, ECNEWS File. 
76. ED Convention, supra note 65, arts. 3(1), 16(1). 
77. ED Convention, supra note 65, arts. 3, 4; Balz, supra note 5, at 508-09. 
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eligible to file an insolvency proceeding.78 For example, if an 
attorney files a personal insolvency proceeding in Germany, 
France would have to recognize the proceeding,79 even though 
attorneys are not eligible to file insolvency proceedings under 
French law. The main insolvency forum also would govern 
which property is "estate property," wherever it may be 
located.80 Estate property will be administered in the main 
insolvency proceeding.81 In the preceding example, the 
liquidator would be able to act in France as well as in 
Germany,82 including physically removing the debtor's assets to 
the country in which the main proceeding is pending.83 
Therefore, a German debtor's assets in France would be 
property of the insolvency estate in Germany. The main 
insolvency forum would be the source of law for any avoiding 
powers given to the liquidator.84 Thus, a liquidator in one 
forum could use that forum's avoiding laws to pursue recovery 
of a preferential transfer from a creditor in a different forum. 
The proceedings' in the main insolvency case would be 
automatically recognized by all other states.85 
These provisions in the EU Convention are reminiscent of the 
best parts of the EEC Draft. This universalist treatment seems 
calculated best to satisfy the main purpose of insolvency 
proceedings, viz. to consolidate assets and debts in one forum 
which will treat all creditors equally. 
Nonetheless the EU Convention excludes certain issues from 
its scope. The excluded issues are of a kind which the drafters 
thought were better covered by conflict of laws principles, 
78. EU Convention, supra note 65, arts. 27-38. The EU Convention by its terms 
excludes insurance companies, credit companies, and investment companies from 
eligibility to file insolvency. EU Convention, supra, art. 1(2). Although some countries 
(including Germany) vehemently objected to these exclusions, most felt that these 
industries would be sufficiently covered by pending EU directives. Schollmeyer, supra 
note 68, at 425; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12. 
79. Balz, supra note 5, at 514. 
80. The term "estate property" includes all property of the debtor. EU 
Convention, supra note 65, art. 27; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422. 
81. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 27. 
82. See EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 18. 
83. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 18(1), (2). 
84. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 4(2)(m). 
85. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 16(1); Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422. 
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including the validity of security interests86 and issues 
regarding sales of property under a reservation of title,87 both 
of which will be determined by the laws of the situs of the 
property. To resolve issues regarding the rights of secured 
creditors, as well as the practical problems inherent in 
liquidating assets from a distance, the EU Convention, like the 
Istanbul Convention before it, authorizes secondary 
proceedings to liquidate some assets locally.88 Secondary 
proceedings, which can be brought in any country in which the 
debtor has an "establishment".s9 would have effect only in that 
particular country.90 Secured creditors can use secondary 
proceedings to protect their interest in collateral,91 and the 
insolvency administrator can use secondary proceedings if he 
fmds that the use of local law to collect on a particular asset is 
more favorable to the insolvency estate.92 
These provisions for main and secondary proceedings eliminate 
some of the problems inherent in the "one forum" (unitarian) 
approach to universality, as employed by the EEC Draft. 
Secured creditors' expectation interests, in particular, mandate 
that rights in assets pledged as collateral should be determined 
locally, at the situs of the collateral, when the validity of 
secured interest is governed by local law. Unsecured creditors 
by definition have no claim to the debtor's assets and should 
not be concerned with where those assets are liquidated. 
Applying a universal law to unsecured creditors seems 
reasonable in light of the goal to provide equal treatment for 
such creditors. 
Applying a universal law also requires that countries not be 
allowed to "opt out" of any part of the convention. Although the 
EU Convention borrowed many concepts from the Istanbul 
Convention,93 it eliminated the latter's principal weakness, 
86. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 5; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422. 
87. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 6; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 438. 
88. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(2). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Balz, supra note 5, at 520. 
92. Id. 
93. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 22. 
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which was that it allowed countries to "opt out" of some of its 
universality provisions. Although the EU Convention's 
drafters discarded the Istanbul Convention's unity theory as 
impractical,94 they declined to allow any country to "opt out" of 
any of the provisions of the Convention. The drafters believed 
that "[t]he requirements of fairness ... militate in favor of 
plural, but properly coordinated, administrations.'>95 Thus the 
EU Convention far exceeds the Istanbul Convention in its 
promotion of universality.96 
In contrast to the Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention 
relies on direct jurisdiction.97 It establishes mandatory uniform 
jurisdictional rules that must be followed by all states. Any 
pre-existing national laws on jurisdiction are supplanted.98 
This provides a stronger basis for jurisdiction than the 
"indirect jurisdiction" proposed by the Istanbul Convention, so 
IS more likely to result in a truly international insolvency 
system. 
The EU Convention also has an important feature that the 
Istanbul Convention lacked: a forum to interpret it. The EU 
Convention authorizes the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
interpret the Convention with binding effect on all 
signatories. 99 The EU Convention further authorizes the ECJ 
to give advisory opinions at the request of national courts.lOO 
Litigation can be anticipated over the meaning of the EU 
Convention because it would be the first of its kind in the EU, 
and comments already have been made over the ambiguity of 
some of its terms. Prudence dictates that a court be granted 
the authority to hear these disputes. 
94. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 28. 
95. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440. 
96. [d. 
97. [d.; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 28; Balz, supra note 5, at 504. 
98. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 29. 
99. EU Convention, supra note 65, arts, 43-46; Balz, supra note 5, at 528. 
100. EU Convention, supra note 65, arts. 44; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 27. 
This provision is patterned on Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. Balz, supra note 5, at 
528n.224. 
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B. THE FATE OF THE EU CONVENTION 
The EU Convention seemed to have resolved most of the 
troublesome issues that plagued past attempts to reach an 
insolvency convention. When it was opened for signature on 
November 23, 1995,101 prospects for a ratified insolvency 
convention looked promising at last. 
The EU Convention, by its own terms, established a deadline of 
May 23, 1996, for obtaining the signatures of all of member 
nations. 102 It also provided that the Convention would not be 
effective, and could not be ratified, unless all fifteen Member 
States signed it.l03 Twelve of the fifteen signed in November 
1995.104 The Netherlands signed in March 1996, and Ireland in 
April 1996,105 bringing the total up to fourteen. As the deadline 
for signatures approached, only the United Kingdom had not 
signed; however, the Lords' Select Committee on European 
Communities, which was studying the Convention, had 
recommended that the United Kingdom sign it, which 
commentators expected it to do.los 
Despite expectations that the United Kingdom would sign the 
EU Convention, however, it refused in the eleventh hour to do 
101. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49; Bankruptcy Convention, supra note 
69; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy» Convention, supra note 12. 
102. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49; Bankruptcy Convention, supra note 
69; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy» Convention, supra note 12. 
103. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49(3) states: "This Convention shall 
not enter into force until it has been ratified, accepted or approved by all the Member 
States of the European Union as constituted on the date on which this Convention is 
closed for signature." 
104. Nielsen, supra note 2, citing 1909th Council Meeting - Justice and Home 
Affairs, Brussels, 19 and 20 March 1996, REUTER EU BRIEFING, April 12, 1996; 
EU / United Kingdom-European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked, 
REUTER TEXTLINE AGENCE EUROPE, May 24, 1996, available on LEXIS, 
INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. 
105. Nielsen, supra note 2, citing 1909th Council Meeting - Justice and Home 
Affairs, Brussels, 19 and 20 March 1996, REUTER EU BRIEFING, April 12, 1996; 
EU / United Kingdom-European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked, 
supra note 104. 
106. UK: Beef Row Thwarts Insolvency Law, REUTER TEXTLINE 
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, May 30, 1996 available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, 
ECNEWS File; U.K Lords Backing for Insolvency Convention, REUTER TEXTLINE 
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, April 18, 1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, 
ECNEWS File. 
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so. The United Kingdom refused to sign the EU Convention in 
retaliation for the total beef ban,t°7 which the EU had imposed 
on March 27, 1996, because British cattle were suffering from 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow" 
disease).108 Four decades of working toward a European 
insolvency treaty thus came to a disappointing halt on the EU's 
May 23, 1996, deadline. 
IV. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 
Despite the United Kingdom's sabotage of the EU Convention, 
some alternatives remain. The alternatives fall into three 
categories, discussed at length below. First, the EU 
Convention could be resurrected. Second, a multi-lateral treaty 
could be concluded among the fourteen EU Member States that 
have already signed the EU Convention. And finally, non-
treaty methods could be used to fashion a solution to the 
problems of cross-border bankruptcy. 
A. RESURRECTING THE EU CONVENTION 
The EU Convention itself contained no provision for extending 
the May 23, 1996, deadline.lo9 Thus under its own terms the 
EU Convention could not become law if it were not signed by 
all 15 Member States by that date. Still, mechanisms have 
been proposed by which the Member States could resurrect the 
EU Convention. The suggestions include: an agreement 
between all fifteen Member States to extend the deadline;l1O a 
special conference of the Council of Ministers to re-open the 
107. Id. The Convention was not the only casualty. The United Kingdom 
maintained a "systematic reservation on all decisions and acts requiring unanimity." 
EU: EU / United Kingdom - European Convention on Insolvency Procedure is 
Deadlocked, supra note 104. 
108. Commission Decision 961239IEEC, March 27, 1996; Have Mad Cows 
Trampled the Insolvency Directive to Death?, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE, No. 
2134, May 25,1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. 
109. White-Knuckle Ride on Final Straight for Bankruptcy Convention, 
EUROPE INFORMATION REPORT NO. 2133, May 22, 1996, available on LEXIS, 
INTLA W Library, ECNEWS File. 
110. Have Mad Cows Trampled the Insolvency Directive to Death?, supra note 
108. 
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Convention for signature;lll and an 
conference coupled with the Member 
agreement to re-open the Convention.l12 
intergovernmental 
States' unanimous 
In late 1996 Manfred Balz, chair of the working group which 
proposed the EU Convention, confidently opined that the 
Council of Ministers would act to re-open the Convention.l13 
The United Kingdom, he predicted, would "come along when 
enough British cattle have been incinerated and sufficient EU 
moneys sunk into British agriculture,,114 Others, too, have 
counted on the United Kingdom's contrition as a powerful force 
in ensuring that the Convention becomes law.1l5 These 
optimistic forecasts have so far proven incorrect. Although 
Mario Monti, European Financial Services Commissioner, is 
quoted in July 1998 as holding out the promise of further 
efforts,116 neither the Council of Ministers nor anyone else has 
taken any action to resurrect the Convention.ll7 It remains 
officially dead. 
B. CREATING A MULTI-LATERAL TREATY AMONG THE 14 
SIGNATORY NATIONS 
Even if the EU Convention itself cannot be resurrected, the 
possibility remains that the fourteen countries that did sign it 
prior to the deadline might choose to conclude a multi-lateral 
insolvency treaty among them.11s So far this is mere 
speculation, as no move has been reported among the fourteen 
Member States to adopt a separate multi-lateral treaty. 
Even if such a multi-lateral treaty were adopted, it might raise 
more problems than it solved. Such a treaty would not be 
111. Id. 
112. European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked, supra note 
104. 
113. Balz, supra note 5, at 529. 
114. Id .. 
115. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 34. 
116. Written Question No. 3450/97, 1998 O.J. 223, 17/07/19981 at 2; No 
Progress Yet on Insolvency Convention, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE 
EUROPEAN REPORT NO. 2290, Feb. 11, 1998, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, 
ECNEWS File. 
117. No Progress Yet on Insolvency Convention, supra note 116. 
118. Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 32. 
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pursuant to the provisions of the European Union treaty, so 
probably would not confer any jurisdiction on the European 
Court of Justice.119 It is far from clear that fewer than all EU 
Member States can make a treaty which would confer 
authority on the European Court of Justice to resolve disputes. 
If the fourteen counties could not confer authority on the 
European Court of Justice, the states would be left without a 
mechanism for interpreting the treaty's provisions. And the 
lack of a court to interpret treaty provisions, it bears repeating, 
was one of the main objections to the Istanbul Convention. 
C. OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
Some European (and American) practitioners would rather not 
see a convention (whether concluded by fifteen countries or just 
fourteen). Doubting the efficacy of the EU Convention, they 
complain that the many compromises in the EU Convention 
reflected the "lowest common denominator" between nations.12o 
They have suggested alternatives including voluntary 
cooperation between nations, enacting individual state laws, 
adhering to the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, and 
adopting the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. These 
alternatives are flawed, however, because each ofthem seeks to 
accomplish some goals that can only be accomplished by a 
convention. 
1. Voluntary Cooperation Among Nations 
Even before the EU Convention was drafted, there was an 
·~"increasing tendency" of the courts in one country to recognize 
the insolvency laws of other countries.121 In light of this 
tendency, it may be possible to allow international insolvencies 
119. Id.; Balz, supra note 5, at 529. 
120. Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 75. 
121. EC: Talks Begin Over European Insolvency Hamwny, REUTER 
TEXTLINE ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Oct. 24, 1991, available on LEXIS, INTLAW 
Library, ECNEWS File. See, e.g., Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A, 
infra note 123, and accompanying text. 
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to be administered by international cooperation between 
members of the insolvency profession and the courtS.122 
An excellent example is the very successful international 
insolvency of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI).123 BCCI was successful because it was among those 
few insolvencies in which the insolvent debtor actually 
reorganizes and remains in business while paying a substantial 
dividend to creditors. BCCI was a British company which 
operated 250 branches in 69 countries, held assets valued at 
$23.5 billion located in 70 jurisdictions, and comprised three 
corporate entities based in Luxembourg and the Cayman 
Islands. 124 BCCrs controlling interest was owned by the 
government of Abu Dhabi.125 Against all odds, liquidators and 
courts in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Cayman 
Islands, and the United States cooperated with each other and 
successfully maximized the return to creditors, from an 
initially anticipated ten percent, to a final distribution of forty 
percent.126 
The initial distribution to the priority creditors was made in 
the United Kingdom under British law.127 The funds were then 
transferred to a court in Luxembourg, which distributed the 
balance of the money to non-priority creditors under 
Luxembourg law.128 The creditors were given a vote as to how 
payment would be made, and were paid pro-rata, without 
regard to where they were located.129 
The BCCI insolvency was a "remarkable triumph of ad hoc, 
cross-border cooperation, accomplished despite the absence of 
122. Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 75. 
123. Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No.2) (1992) British 
Company Cases 715 (C.A); Judgment of Jan. 3, 1992, District Court of Luxembourg, 
Sixth Chamber (1431. 12P) (M. Welter); United States v. BCCI Holdings 
(Luxembourg), SA, No. CR 91-0655, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 676 (D.D.C. 1992). 
124. Id.; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 434. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 435. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 436-37. 
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any formal international provisions."130 As remarkable as this 
accomplishment was, it succeeded in large part because the 
stakes were so high and so much money was spent on fees for 
accountants, attorneys, and liquidators.l31 If BCCl's assets had 
been much smaller, or if no incentives existed for the creditors 
or courts to cooperate, success would have been far less likely. 
The problem with relying on cooperation to sort out the 
implications of cross-border insolvencies is that it is unreliable. 
If cooperation were working, we would not see experts working 
for decades toward insolvency conventions. The soundness of 
the "voluntary cooperation" alternative is disproved by forty 
years of unsuccessful work on various insolvency conventions. 
Depending on voluntary cooperation is akin to depending on 
the kindness of strangers: it is a gamble, not a certainty, and 
requires trust. The insolvency field has been "characterized by 
extreme parochialism and noncooperation."132 Rather than 
working together to assure that all debtors and creditors are 
treated equally, countries generally are interested in aiding 
their own debtors to the detriment of foreign creditors, or in 
aiding their own creditors to the detriment of foreign debtors or 
foreign creditors. Countries are too interested in protecting 
their own citizens, policies, and sovereignty, to cooperate 
readily in c'ross-border insolvency proceedings, unless they 
have a strong incentive to do so. Thus the voluntary 
cooperation alternative is not realistic. 
2. Enacting Individual National Laws 
Individual countries might enact their own national laws to 
guide their courts through cross-border insolvency 
proceedings. 133 The national laws would have to specifically 
cover cross-border insolvencies, whether the debtor or the 
creditors are residents of that country, and establish specific 
130. ld. at 436. 
131. ld. 
132. Harold Burman et al., Introductory Note, United Nations Committee on 
International Trade ,Law's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386, 
1387 (1997). ' 
133. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 441. 
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procedures. Further, the laws must grant the courts the power 
to act in furtherance of those laws. 
The United States is a model, insofar as it passed a specific 
section of its own Bankruptcy Code, which gives foreign 
liquidators certain powers to act in American bankruptcy 
proceedings.l34 Manfred Balz, chairman of the EU Council 
Group on Bankruptcy and author of the EU Convention, 
believes that Germany will probably adopt the EU Convention 
rules as its own German system of international insolvency 
law, thus applying the Convention rules, to the extent possible, 
unilaterally and without requiring reciprocity.135 
Germany's elimination of any reciprocity requirement is 
essential. One historical problem with the idea that each 
nation can pass its own laws to deal with insolvency has been 
that countries often impose a "reciprocity" requirement on each 
other: a sort of "I will but only if you do too" mentality. Such 
an approach offers no guarantee that the other country 
involved in the cross-border proceeding will recognize the 
proceedings occurring in the first forum. France, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg typically have applied a reciprocity requirement 
before recognizing other countries' laws.136 
If other countries would follow Germany's lead, and impose no 
reciprocity requirement, then individual national law could 
provide a solution to the problems caused by cross-border 
insolvencies. But even then, this solution would only work if 
each country were to enact the exact same laws. Otherwise the 
purpose of insolvency proceedings - equal treatment of 
creditors - cannot be ensured. Enactment of identical national 
laws is unlikely in light of Europe's historical lack of common 
insolvency procedures. 
134. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994) provides: "A case ancillary to a foreign 
proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under 
this section by a foreign representative." 
135. Balz, supra note 5, at 530. 
136. [d. at 488 n.7. 
25
Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
230 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
3. Adhering to the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat was drafted by a 
committee of the International Bar Association's Section on 
Business Law. The committee, justifiably fearing that a 
convention would not be realized, began drafting the Cross-
Border Insolvency Concordat in 1993, and approved the final 
version in 1995.137 A concordat is neither a law nor a treaty, 
but rather a set of principles that provides guidance.l3s The 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat139 sets forth ten 
principles140 to be followed by parties and tribunals in 
international insolvency proceedings.l41 Because it is neither a 
law nor a treaty, but only a set of principles, the Concordat can 
be implemented in insolvency proceedings only by court orders 
and/or stipulations between various estate representatives.142 
In contrast to the EU Convention, the Concordat is not limited 
to EU countries, but is intended to be implemented worldwide. 
137. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 537. 
138. "Concordat" is a term applied historically to agreements between a 
national government and a religious group, in which certain principles are given 
"eminence" but do not become law. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 536, citing WEBSTER'S 
NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 471 (3d ed. 1993). 
139. International Bar Association Section of Business Law's Committee J 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (Concordat), Sept. 15, 1995, in Nielsen, supra note 
2. 
140. The ten principles are: (1) primary responsibility in a single 
administrative forum; (2) claims administration in a single administrative forum; (3) 
liquidator may appear in any forum where an insolvency is pending, and creditors have 
similar rights; (4) coordination between fora; (5) transfer of asset from local to main 
insolvency proceeding; (6) liquidator may employ rules of plenary forum even though 
those rules are not available in the main forum; (7) liquidator may employ voiding 
rules of any forum; (8) each forum decides the value and allowability of claims before it 
using a conflict of law analysis; (9) composition proceeding is not barred simply because 
some of the fora do not provide for compositions; (10) prevents actions that would 
destroy the reasonable commercial expectations of parties to contacts. Id. 
141. Cf UNIDROIT (ed.), Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(1994). UNIDROIT's principles are an ambitious proposal for the unification of 
international contract law through a restatement-like set of neutral rules, issued by a 
private working group of specialized practitioners and academics. Klaus Peter Berger, 
International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 129, 129-30 (1998). 
142. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 538. The Concordat has been implemented in at 
least two international insolvency proceedings, although neither involved European 
nations. One proceeding involved the United States and Canada; the other, the United 
States and Israel. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 535. 
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The Concordat utilizes a modified universality approach, 
similar to that used by the EU Convention, but with more 
flexibility. Like the Istanbul and EU Conventions, the 
Concordat prefers one central administrative forum as the 
most efficient. But, unlike the "center of main interests" test 
used by the Istanbul and EU Conventions, the Concordat 
provides for filing the main insolvency proceeding in the 
country that is the debtor's "nerve center."143 The Concordat 
does recognize, however, that one main proceeding might not 
always be possible or practical. Therefore it is flexible _enough 
to allow for two or more plenary proceedings to be brought 
concurrently, or for one main proceeding and one or more 
limited proceedings to coexist.144 
The provisions of the Concordat differ from those of the EU 
Convention with regard to administration of an insolvency 
when more than one proceeding is pending. Unlike the 
provisions of the EU Convention, which restrict the liquidator 
to administering the insolvency under the laws of the country 
where the main proceeding is pending, the Concordat's 
prOVISIons allow the liquidator to use the insolvency 
administration laws of any forum in which any part of the 
insolvency is pending.145 
In addition, although the EU Convention restricts the 
liquidator to using the voiding laws of the forum where the 
avoidance action will be brought, the Concordat allows the 
liquidator to choose between the laws of any forum in which 
any part of the insolvency is pending when voiding 
transactions. 146 If, for example, a debtor residing in Germany 
is indebted to a creditor domiciled in France, and the French 
company received a pre-insolvency preferential transfer, the 
EU Convention and the Concordat provide different results. 
The EU Convention would require the law of France to be used 
in an avoidance action. The Concordat allows the liquidator to 
choose to recover the payment under either French or German 
143. Concordat, supra note 139, at 9. 
144. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 535. 
145. Concordat, supra note 139, principle 6; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 55!. 
146. Concordat, supra note 139, principle 7. 
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insolvency law. The Concordat thus discourages a debtor from 
"forum shopping" in its choice of a main forum, because its 
choice of main proceeding cannot thereby limit the liquidator to 
the laws of that forum. 
The Concordat's prOVISIOns, however, are subject to 
international conflict of laws principles. The remedy sought by 
the liquidator cannot be a remedy that would be inconsistent 
with principles of international law.147 Interestingly, the 
Concordat offers an example, not using European countries as 
might be expected, but using parties from Hong Kong and the 
United States.148 The liquidator of a Hong Kong company in 
insolvency proceedings in Hong Kong might seek to use United 
States law to avoid a transfer made to an American company in 
the United States. This would be allowed under the Concordat, 
as it would not be unexpected or unfair. It would be 
unexpected and unfair, however, to use United States law to 
try to avoid a transfer between two Hong Kong companies. The 
Hong Kong companies would not expect the law of the latter 
country to be used to set aside a transaction which occurred in 
the bank's own country, and thus this would not be allowed 
under the Concordat.149 The Concordat's drafters believed that 
it was important to prevent uncertainty and the disruption of 
reasonable commercial expectations that might hinder 
international commerce.150 
The Concordat's rules on determining and paying claims are 
more similar to those found in Istanbul Convention than in the 
EU Convention. Like both of those two conventions, the 
Concordat provides that secured and priority claims can be 
determined on a local basis, through local proceedings (plenary 
or limited), and that the surplus should be forwarded on to the 
main proceeding, which then provides for pro-rata distribution 
to all creditors.151 The Concordat, like the Istanbul Convention, 
also provides that if a claim is filed in more than one forum, it 
147. [d. 
148. Concordat, supra note 139, principle 7; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 552. 
149. [d. 
150, Concordat, supra note 139, principles 8, 10. 
151. Concordat, supra note 139, arts. 2, 4, 5. 
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will be adjusted to assure that the claimant does not receive 
more than its share of the pro-rate distribution.152 The EU 
Convention does not so limit claims. The Concordat's provision 
is more consistent with the purpose of insolvency proceedings: 
distribution of the debtor's assets under a consistent set of 
rules which assures that all creditors are treated equally, 
based on the percentage of claims filed in each forum.153 
The Concordat's flexible and pragmatic solutions are its main 
advantages. Nonetheless, the Concordat suffers from a serious 
weakness: it lacks the force oflaw. It is optional and cannot be 
expected to be followed uniformly by all countries in all 
situations. It ultimately depends on mutual cooperation, which 
is always subject to political whims, reprisals, desires for 
protection of nationals, and other factors. Thus the Concordat 
is as flawed as other non-treaty solutions. 
It may be many years before a multi-lateral treaty is adopted 
in Europe.154 In the mean time, solutions such as the 
Concordat offer practical guidelines to those who wish to follow 
them. 
4. Adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
The rapid growth of international trade has led in turn to an 
increasing number of cross-border insolvencies, which have 
affected investment and trade around, the world.155 Attempts to 
reach a treaty solution have failed repeatedly. Therefore, in 
1993, the United Nations Committee on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), in close cooperation with the International 
Association of Insolvency Practitioners (lNSOL), began work 
on a Transnational Insolvency Project.156 UNCITRAL at first 
considered drafting a treaty, but abandoned the idea because of 
the historical difficulty of achieving international agreement in 
152. Concordat, supra note 139, principle 4; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 549. 
153. Concordat, supra note 139, at 4; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 549. 
154. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 535. N. 10. 
155. Burman, supra note 132. 
156. Westbrook, supra note 1, at 569. 
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insolvency matters.157 Instead, UNCITRAL directed its efforts 
toward a model law. These efforts culminated in the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which was adopted by 
UNCITRAL on May 30, 1997.158 In contrast to the Concordat, 
the provisions of the Model Law will become law in those 
nations that adopt it.159 
. The Model Law aims to prepare a uniform standard for 
recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings and facilitating 
cooperation across the borders.16o It was intended to cover the 
many situations in which local law does not authorize the local 
courts to cooperate in any foreign insolvency proceedings.161 It 
expressly empowers courts to recognize foreign insolvency 
proceedings,162 and gives the foreign liquidator access to local 
courts without having to engage in any diplomatic 
formalities. l63 It not only empowers the court to cooperate 
with the foreign proceeding,164 but also directs it to do so to the 
maximum extent possible.165 
The Model Law imposes no limit on any country's jurisdiction 
to commence or continue its own insolvency proceeding. Like 
the Istanbul and EC Conventions, it uses the concepts of 
"center of main interests" and "establishment."166 The debtor 
may file its main insolvency proceeding in the country where 
its main center of interests lies. Secondary proceedings may 
be filed where the debtor has an "establishment." The courts, 
however, must cooperate to coordinate the proceedings.167 
157. Burman, supra note 132. 
158. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386 (1997) 
159. Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. 
AlCN.9/442 (1997). 
160. Guide to Enactment, supra note 159, at 8. 
161. Guide to Enactment, supra note 159, at 15. 
162. Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 15-17. 
163. Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 9-13, 23-24. 
164. Model Law, supra note 158, arts.25-27. 
165. Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 25,30. 
166. Model Law, supra note 158, art. 2(a), (t). 
167. Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 29-30. 
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The Model Law gives standing to a foreign liquidator to bring 
avoidance actions. The Model Law does not create any 
substantive avoidance law, however but limits the types of 
actions to those available to an insolvency administrator under 
the law of the enacting country (as distinguished from actions 
available to ordinary creditors).l68 
The Model Law is very modest in its ambitions. It seeks not so 
much to create a universal system of substantive insolvency 
laws, but to effectuate cooperation. This article has 
demonstrated the difficulties of getting countries to agree on 
insolvency laws. Still, the Model Law offers a better solution 
than voluntary cooperation, or even the Concordat, because 
once enacted, it would have the force of law behind it: a law 
mandating cooperation. 
The Model Law will only be effective in those countries that 
enact it.169 UNCITRAL has the goal that the Model Law could 
be enacted and be effective worldwide. Certainly it would not 
be particularly helpful or worthwhile unless it were enacted by 
many countries, and on the same terms. When enacting the· 
Model Law, however, a state may modify or omit any of its 
provisions.17o This undermines the concept of universality. To 
ensure fair and equal treatment of all creditors, universality is 
the necessary ingredient in an insolvency policy. Similarly, 
countries also may balk at adopting the Model Law because 
they do not want to bind themselves where others are not 
bound. True reciprocity and harmony can be guaranteed only 
by a treaty, and not by any national law alone. 
168. Model Law, supra note 23. 
169. Guide to Enactment, supra note 159, at 7. 
170. [d. at 8. 
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The Model Law has not yet been enacted anywhere.l7l Still, 
some model laws have been widely accepted. Twenty-five 
countries have adopted UNCITRAL's Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration.172 If the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency obtains half the success of the Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, that will far 
surpass the success of any other attempt to solve the problems 
arising from cross-border insolvency proceedings. 
v. CONCLUSION 
An EU-wide convention still offers the best chance for 
harmonizing European insolvency laws, despite the problems 
that have dogged efforts to conclude one. Countries do not 
readily cooperate with foreign insolvency proceedings, owing to 
their differing insolvency laws and desires to protect their own 
citizens, assets, and sovereignty. Thus,.it is unwise to rely on 
cooperation to ensure fair and equal treatment of debtors and 
creditors alike. Enacting purely national legislation is not 
efficacious and is fraught with reciprocity problems. 
Only a Convention - and one without opt-out provisions, at 
that - will be equally binding on all nations. The most recent 
EU Convention, though not perfect, is the result of nearly 40 
years' worth of cumulative effort, and still represents the best 
available option. The European Union should find a way to 
resurrect the European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings and ratify it once and for all. 
This convention still will not cover those international 
insolvency proceedings that extend beyond Europe, or into 
171. Ironically the Model Law was passed in the United States by both houses 
of Congress but became the victim of unrelated arguments, about amending the 
consumer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Conference Report, R.R. CONF. REP. 
NO. 105-794, reprinted in Congo Rec. R9954-9985, at 9974-77 (1998). 
172. Note by the [UNCITRAL] Secretariat, Status of Conventions (U.N. Doc. 
AlCN.9/428) (1996), available at www.smu.edul-pwinship/arb-21.htm.Klaus; Peter 
Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, Mealey's 
International Arbitration Report (Mealey Pub. Jan. 28, 1998), available on LEXIS, 
INTLAW Library, INTLTR File. 
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Europe from beyond.173 As such multinational, cross-border 
insolvency proceedings continue to increase, the EU may decide 
to enter into treaty discussions with a wider group of nations. 
The United Nations (and in particular UNCITRAL) may be 
best equipped to accomplish this, when the time comes. 
173. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 48; Balz, supra note 5, at 497. 
33
Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
34
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/8
